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ARE THERE REALLY TWO SIDES OF THE CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION COIN? THE APPLICATION OF THE BROADEST
REASONABLE INTERPRETATION AT THE PTAB
PAULA MILLER, MARIANNE TERROT, STACY LEWIS & TOM IRVING
Abstract
The USPTO has applied the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI)
claim construction standard during prosecution, reexamination, and other
office proceedings for decades. The Supreme Court affirmed in Cuozzo
Speed Technologies Inc. that BRI is also the appropriate standard for
unexpired claims in post-grant proceedings at the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board (PTAB). Leading up to Cuozzo, many parties speculated that the
PTAB’s application of BRI might create confusion and result in
inconsistent outcomes at the district court level. Notably, nothing in the
America Invents Act establishes a standard of deference between PTAB
and district court decisions. But so far, there has been minimal confusion.
This Article explores the application of the BRI at the PTAB level and
evaluates if there really is any difference in applying the BRI standard
compared with the Phillips standard. This Article also discusses whether
other distinctions, such as different evidentiary standards, or just plain
different evidence being presented, had a greater effect than claim
construction standards in the few cases where a district court and the
PTAB have construed the same claim language differently.
The Supreme Court recently affirmed the constitutionality of postgrant proceedings at the PTAB in Oil States Energy Services, LLC. v.
Greene’s Energy Group, LLC. However, questions of “takings,”
“retroactive application,” and “due process” remain on the judicial
horizon.

 Paula Miller and Marianne Terrot, Ph.D. are associates, Stacy Lewis is a law clerk, and Tom Irving is
a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Finnegan Henderson Farabow Garrett & Dunner LLP.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has applied
a broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) claim construction standard for
decades. By contrast, district courts apply a deferential presumption of
validity—the claim construction standard set out in Phillips v. AWH Corp.1
These two standards have occasionally led to divergent outcomes when the
validity and patentability of the same patent has been considered under the
Phillips standard as well as under the BRI by the USPTO’s Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (PTAB), respectively.2 The Leahy–Smith America Invents
Act of 20113 (AIA) created new proceedings for the PTAB to evaluate the
patentability of issued claims, and such proceedings have become popular
alternatives to district court litigation, further highlighting the differences
in the two venues.4 The AIA establishes no deference between PTAB and
district court decisions, and, moreover, does not even state if the PTAB
would be bound by a district court order, or vice versa.5
Under the Phillips standard, claims are construed according to the
“ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term.”6 To determine the
meaning of a claim term, “the court looks to ‘those sources available to the
public that show what a person of ordinary skill in the art would have

1. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
2. For example, in PPC Broadband, the Federal Circuit found the claim construction standard
was outcome determinative. Compare PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC,
815 F.3d 734, 742 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding the construction of the term “continuity member” under the
Phillips standard requires “consistent or continuous contact with the coupler/nut and the post to
establish an electrical connection”), with id. at 743 (finding the construction under the BRI had no
requirement of consistent or continuous contact, and thus the Board’s construction was broader than the
construction under Phillips).
3. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
4. Alana Canfield Mannige, The Standard of Review for Claim Construction in Inter Partes
Review, 8 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 157, 159 (2016); William Hannah, Major Change, New
Chapter: How Inter Partes Review and Post Grant Review Proceedings Created by the America Invents
Act Will Shape Litigation Strategies, 17 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 27, 39–44 (2012).
5. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1297, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
6. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
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understood disputed claim language to mean.’”7 Those sources include “the
words of the claim themselves, the remainder of the specification, the
prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific
principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.”8 BRI
also construes claims according to the ordinary and customary meaning as
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.9
BRI also looks to the specification and gives claim terms the broadest
reasonable construction, given the specification.10 The Federal Circuit has
stated, “[t]he broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim term may be the
same as, or broader than, the construction of a term under the Phillips
standard. But it cannot be narrower.”11 One reason given by the USPTO for
using BRI is that the applicant can amend the claims during prosecution.
Examining a claim according to its BRI reduces the possibility that the
claim will later be interpreted more broadly than is justified.12 The PTAB
generally determines patentability based on whether it is more likely than
not that a patent claim is unpatentable—a preponderance of the evidence
standard.13 In contrast, patents reviewed by district courts have a
presumption of validity, and clear and convincing evidence must be used to
overcome the presumption.14 If a district court, after using the claim
construction tools available under the Phillips standard, finds a claim is
ambiguous, cases hold that a court generally should construe the claim to

7. Id. at 1314 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d
1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Adidas AG v. Nike, Inc., IPR2013-00067, Paper 18, at 10 (P.T.A.B. May 17, 2013);
In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
10. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111 (Rev. 9, 2018) (“The broadest
reasonable interpretation does not mean the broadest possible interpretation. Rather, the meaning given
to a claim term must be consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning of the term (unless the
term has been given a special definition in the specification), and must be consistent with the use of the
claim term in the specification and drawings. Further, the broadest reasonable interpretation of the
claims must be consistent with the interpretation that those skilled in the art would reach.”); see also In
re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The correct inquiry in giving a claim term
its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification is not whether the specification
proscribes or precludes some broad reading of the claim term adopted by the examiner. And it is not
simply an interpretation that is not inconsistent with the specification. It is an interpretation that
corresponds with what and how the inventor describes his invention in the specification, i.e., an
interpretation that is ‘consistent with the specification.’”).
11. Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 F. App’x 864, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
12. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111 (Rev. 9, 2018) (citing In re Yamamoto,
740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re
Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404–05 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2014).
14. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2011).
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preserve its validity.15 The PTAB does not apply this doctrine, but instead
applies the broadest of otherwise equally acceptable constructions.16
I.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

In 2016, the Supreme Court affirmed the PTAB’s use of the BRI
standard in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee.17 Before Cuozzo,
parties noted that the PTAB’s application of BRI had the potential for
producing results inconsistent with district court litigation outcomes.18
Among others, several large corporations filed a joint amicus brief
challenging the PTAB’s application of BRI in post-grant proceedings,
arguing that “[u]sing different standards to construe the claims of issued
patents creates uncertainty as well as opportunities for gamesmanship.”19
Also before Cuozzo was decided, bills were introduced in both the House
and Senate to change the PTAB’s claim construction standard to align with
the district court’s deferential standard,20 and several law review articles
advocated for unifying the standards.21 Other corporations, scholars, and
amici supported the difference, noting that no presumption of validity
exists when the agency reviews its own granted patents.22 Cuozzo generally

15. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The applicability of
this preservation-of-validity doctrine “depends on the strength of the inference that the PTO would have
recognized that one claim interpretation would render the claim invalid, and that the PTO would not
have issued the patent assuming that to be the proper construction of the term.” Id. As relevant
background, a patent claim that is ambiguous may also be invalid for indefiniteness. 35 U.S.C. § 112
(2011). The indefiniteness analysis considers the claim as a whole, not just each claim term. MANUAL
OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2173 (Rev. 9, 2018) (citing Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
216 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Larsen, 10 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
16. SAP Am. v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., CBM2012-00001, Paper 70, at 17 (P.T.A.B. June 11,
2013) (the Office explained the requirement “as requiring the use of the broadest reasonable
interpretation, as opposed to the district court standard of construing to preserve validity.”); RF
Controls, LLC v. A-1 Packaging Sols., Inc., IPR2015-00119, Paper 10, at 8–9 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2015)
(“In an inter partes proceeding there is no presumption of validity, therefore, we will not be applying a
rule of construction with an aim to preserve the validity of claims.”).
17. 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
18. See, e.g., id. at 2146 (Cuozzo argued “that the use of the broadest reasonable construction
standard in inter partes review, together with use of an ordinary meaning standard in district court, may
produce inconsistent results and cause added confusion.”).
19. Brief for Neither Party as Amici Curiae at 6, Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793
F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 2014-1194).
20. H.R. 5360, 113th Cong. § 3308 (2014); S. 1720, 113th Cong. § 7 (2013).
21. See, e.g., Mannige, supra note 4, at 178–79; see also Julian Pymento, Let’s Be Reasonable!
The Broadest Reasonable Interpretation in the PTAB, 5 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 406, 406,
435–36 (2016).
22. See, e.g., Brief of Dell Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 19, 21, Cuozzo
Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) (No. 15-446), 2016 WL 1319652, at *19, *21; Brief
of Amicus Curiae Unified Patents Inc. in Support of Respondent at 4, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v.
Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) (No. 15-446), 2016 WL 1298289, at *4.
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muted these disputes by affirming that the PTAB and the courts could
continue to apply different standards.23
Though the potential for inconsistent results was broadly discussed,
the reality has been that the PTAB and district courts have largely produced
uniform results on validity and patentability using the different claim
construction standards.24 The PTAB has clarified that it is not bound by
district court constructions, citing the different claim construction standards
applicable.25 The PTAB has also acknowledged prior district court
constructions without addressing the claim construction standards.26 Yet,
the PTAB has often considered a district court construction as persuasively
authoritative. At times, the PTAB has even adopted the exact same
construction after determining it was consistent with BRI.27
In Cisco Systems Inc. v. AIP Acquisition LLC,28 a PTAB panel
evaluated a patent under both standards. The PTAB instituted review of the
claims prior to the patent’s expiration and provided a preliminary claim
construction for three terms based on BRI.29 The PTAB and the parties then
discussed that the patent was likely to expire before the final written
decision.30 The PTAB determined that based on the record, the claim
construction of the three terms would be the same under “the rule of
construction similar to that applied by the district courts.”31
There have been rare instances when the PTAB adopted a standard
that diverged from a previous district court construction.32 For example, in

23. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016).
24. See, e.g., Joshua Landau, Letter to House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property and the Internet, COMPUT. & COMMC’NS INDUS. ASS’N (Nov. 13, 2017),
http://www.ccianet.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Subcommittee-Letter-Re-Malone-Data.pdf
(“PTAB only rarely disagrees with the federal courts when both review the validity of the same
patent.”).
25. See Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Depomed, Inc., IPR2014-00654, Paper 69, at 9 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 21,
2015) (“Given our different claim construction standard, however, we are not bound by the prior district
court constructions or any alleged agreements between the parties made in district court.”).
26. See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Green’s Energy Grp., LLC, No. 16-712, slip op. at
5, 584 U.S. __ (2018) (“The Board acknowledged the District Court’s contrary decision [on claim
construction], but nonetheless concluded that the claims were anticipated by the prior art.”).
27. See, e.g., Oracle Corp. v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., IPR2014–01207, Paper 78, at 9 (P.T.A.B. Jan.
29, 2016); Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., IPR2014-01544, Paper 50, at 8–9 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 29,
2016); Google Inc., v. Simpleair Inc., CBM2014-00054, Paper 19, at 11 (P.T.A.B. May 13, 2014);
Kyocera Corp. v. Softview, LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 53, at 7–8 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2014).
28. IPR2014-00247, Paper 14, at 12–18 (P.T.A.B. May 27, 2014).
29. Id.
30. Cisco Sys. Inc. v. AIP Acquisition LLC, IPR2014-00247, Paper 17, at 3 (P.T.A.B. June 26,
2014).
31. IPR2014-00247, Paper 20, at 3 (P.T.A.B. July 10, 2014).
32. See, e.g., Vibrant Media Inc. v. Gen. Elec., Co., IPR2013-00170, Paper 14 (P.T.A.B. July 29,
2013).
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Rackspace Hosting v. Rotatable Technologies, a district court had
determined, based on the specification, that the claim language “computer
display window” would include a graphical user interface (GUI).33
However, the PTAB found this was not explicit in the specification, and
instead looked to a technical dictionary definition to determine that the
claimed phrase should be construed as “a division of a display screen in
which a set of information is displayed.”34 As the PTAB’s construction
required no GUI, additional prior art applied in the PTAB’s review that did
not apply in the district court.35 This difference did not necessarily stem
from a difference in the two standards, but could be seen as having
stemmed from different readings of the specification. Both the PTAB and
the district court looked to the same specification to define “computer
display window,” but the PTAB concluded that the specification provided
no definition for that term. The difference could also have come from
neither party advocating for a construction that included a GUI in the inter
partes review (IPR) proceeding, while both parties at the district court level
included a GUI in their proposed constructions.36
In Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc., the patent owner proposed a construction
of the phrase “secure domain name service” that included recognizing that
a message is requesting secure computer access, while the petitioner
proposed a construction without that requirement.37 The patent owner
argued that it had disclaimed embodiments without the “recognizing”
requirement during prosecution, and those disclaimers should limit claim
construction.38 However, the PTAB found there had not been an

33. Rotatable Techs. LLC v. Nokia, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-265-JRG, 2013 WL 3992930, at *9 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 2, 2013) (applying the construction “a GUI displayable on a monitor or a screen”). Rotatable
Technologies had advocated no construction was needed and in the alternative asked that “computer
display window” be construed as “a graphical user interface window.” Id. Nokia had proposed the
construction “[a] GUI that is displayed on the display monitor or screen where the GUI may be sized to
display all or only a portion of total information made available for viewing by a program.” Id.
34. Rackspace Hosting, Inc. v. Rotatable Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00248, Paper 10, at 8–9
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2013).
35. Pymento, supra note 21, at 417.
36. Compare Rackspace Hosting, IPR2013-00248, Paper 2, at 9–10 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 12, 2013)
(Petitioner advocated to construe “computer display window” as “a window generated by an operating
system or an application program”), with IPR2013-00248, Paper 9, at 6 (P.T.A.B. July 18, 2013) (Patent
Owner advocated that there was no need to further define “computer display window” the term beyond
its plain and ordinary meaning, and did not provide a construction). Patent owner Rotatable
Technologies consistently advocated that no construction of the term was needed, but before the district
court had argued in the alternative that if a construction was provided, that it included a GUI. See
Rotatable Techs. LLC v. Nokia, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-265-JRG, 2013 WL 3992930, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Aug.
2, 2013). The opposing party in the district court, Nokia, had also included a GUI in their proposed
construction. Id.
37. IPR2014-00481, Paper 35, at 14–15 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 24, 2015).
38. Id. at 20–21, 25.

2018

TWO SIDES OF THE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION COIN

49

unequivocal disclaimer requiring incorporation of the “recognize”
function.39 The PTAB also reviewed the claim, the specification,40 and the
record before the district court.41 The district court had construed that
phrase with the “recognizing” requirement, though the patent owner had
argued before the district court for a construction without that
requirement—the opposite of what it later argued before the Board.42 The
PTAB adopted the petitioner’s proposed construction, a broader
construction than the district court had adopted.43 The PTAB noted that the
record before it was distinct from the district court’s, the construction
followed the patent owner’s earlier arguments, and the construction
followed the specification.44 The patent owner’s inadequate and
inconsistent arguments affected the PTAB’s construction. The Federal
Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s claim constructions on appeal.45
A review of case citations in IPR proceedings applying the BRI
between February 2015 and February 2016 found that the BRI cases were
still “largely citing legal authority that originates from the Phillips regime,”
over 90% of the PTAB’s final written decisions applied legal standards
derived exclusively, or partially, from the Phillips regime.46 The author of
the review concludes that the two claim construction standards appear to
have converged in practice “due to the inherent ambiguities in
interpretation or litigant behavior rather than a difference between the legal
standards.”47

39. Id. at 19.
40. Id. at 15–16.
41. Id. at 24–25.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 26.
44. Id. at 25.
45. Virnetx Inc. v. Apple Inc., 671 F. App’x 786, 787 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
46. Laura E. Dolbow, A Distinction Without a Difference: Convergence in Claim Construction
Standards, 70 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1071, 1084, 1088 (2017) (“Overall, 36% of final written decisions
cited only district court authority; 56% of final written decisions cited a mix of district court authority
and pure PTO authority; 2% cited only pure PTO authority; and 6% contained only conclusory
citations. Thus, over 90% of the decisions applied legal principles that derived exclusively or partially
from the district court realm, yet only six decisions applied legal principles that derived purely from the
PTO. Overall, data suggest that in IPR proceedings, the BRI standard functions as a circular standard
that appears to be distinct from Phillips, yet returns to district court-originated jurisprudence for most of
its substantive guidance.”).
47. Accord id. at 1089.
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OTHER FACTORS MAY HAVE A GREATER IMPACT ON
VALIDITY/PATENTABILITY

Claim construction can affect the ultimate outcome on
validity/patentability. However, practitioners have suggested that where the
PTAB and the district court reach inconsistent conclusions, the difference
can be accredited to “additional circumstances, such as new prior art being
presented between proceedings, a different burden of proof standard, or a
party inadequately advocating for consistent claim constructions.”48 In an
exemplary case, the Federal Circuit found that the different evidentiary
standard justified the divergent outcomes. The Federal Circuit affirmed the
validity of the patents on appeal from the district court,49 but later affirmed
their unpatentability on appeal from the PTAB.50 The parties provided
additional evidence to the PTAB that was not before the district court.
Though the Federal Circuit stated it would have been “unsurprising that
different records may lead to different findings and conclusions,” the court
stated that different outcomes could be justified even if the record was the
same.51 Citing Cuozzo, the Federal Circuit reiterated that different
evidentiary burdens could result in inconsistent validity decisions.52
The Federal Circuit stated that its decision was consistent with In re
Baxter International, Inc., wherein the court described an aspirational
model when it stated that the USPTO “ideally should not arrive at a
different conclusion” if it faces the same evidence and argument as a
district court.53 In re Baxter International involved an ex parte
reexamination while a district court litigation was pending.54 The district
court held that Baxter’s patent claims were valid, and the Federal Circuit
affirmed that some claims were valid, vacating and remanding the royalty
award.55 The district court declined to stay the litigation pending the
USPTO reexamination.56 Prior to the district court reaching a final
judgment, the USPTO reexamination concluded and affirmed the

48. Miyoung Shin & Peter Lee, Finding Consistency Among Claim Construction Standards,
LAW360 (July 20, 2016, 11:13 AM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/817773/findingconsistency-among-claim-construction-standards.
49. Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 611 F. App’x 988, 990–97 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
50. Novartis AG v. Noven Pharm. Inc., 853 F.3d 1289, 1292–96 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
51. Id. at 1294.
52. Id. (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016)).
53. Id. (quoting In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
54. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
55. Id. at 1333 (citing Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1304 (Fed. Cir.
2009)).
56. Id. at 1335.
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examiner’s determination that the patent claims would have been obvious.57
In affirming the decision of the USPTO reexamination finding
unpatentability of the claims, the Federal Circuit observed that the
examiner had based the rejections on references that were not at issue at the
district court.58 The Federal Circuit again weighed in to address the
inconsistent outcomes, and held that its prior ruling of validity was not
sufficiently final to preclude a cancellation of Baxter’s patent claims in the
USPTO; thus, the pending litigation was moot.59
CONCLUSION
Every case has its own facts and circumstances. Despite the rare cases
where a particular phrase has been construed differently by a district court
and by the PTAB, in practice, the Phillips and BRI claim construction
standards have largely produced consistent results. Even in those cases,
differing constructions can generally be attributed to the arguments of the
parties, rather than discord between the standards. When confronted with
the possibility of parallel proceedings, consider both standards early in
litigation, advancing one consistent construction.
The Supreme Court recently handed down its decision in Oil States
Energy Services, LLC. v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, upholding, at least
narrowly, the constitutionality of post-grant proceedings at the PTAB.60
There may still be open issues, however, on questions of “takings,”
“retroactive application,” and “due process” that remain to be resolved.61
But, at least for now, post-grant proceedings at the PTAB are alive.

57. Id. (citing Ex parte Baxter Int’l, Inc., Appeal 2009-006493, 2010 WL 1048980, at *17
(B.P.A.I. Mar. 18, 2010)).
58. Id. (citing In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1365–66).
59. Id. at 1341, 1347.
60. No. 16-712, slip op. at 16–17, 584 U.S. __ (2018).
61. Id. at 17.

